VS.

JOSE LUIS LOPEZ-LOPEZ,

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Attorney for JOSE LUIS LOPEZ-LOPEZ

#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES, | CASE NO. 07 cr 3346-H

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO COMPEL

GOVERNMENT TO REOFFER 48

MONTHS

Defendant.

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Date: April 28, 2008

I.

#### **FACTS**

The government has indicted Mr. Lopez-Lopez being a deported alien found in the U.S. in violation of 8 USC § 1326.

Before he was indicted, the government offered Mr. Lopez-Lopez a 48 month deal, which he accepted. On November 20, 2007 Mr. Lopez-Lopez waived indictment. (11/20/07 RT [Ex. A hereto], 5:1.] However, on December 11, 2007, the date set for the plea in the case, Mr. Lopez-Lopez's counsel stated as follows:

I did want to let the Court know that originally we did need some more time to resolve some issues in Mr. Lopez's case and he's indicated to me this morning that he was wanting to plead guilty and I keep wavering, but we do need some additional time and I think that the best thing is to do just - - I was told we just set some dates in front of the assigned district court judge. (12/11/07 RT [Ex. B hereto], 2: 2-8.)

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Previous counsel for Mr. Lopez-Lopez then advised the U.S. Magistrate Judge that "we may be able to resolve this case" but neither he, the Court, or the Assistant U.S. Attorney ever noted that Mr. Lopez-Lopez would lose the 48 month offer if he did not plead that date. (12/11/07 RT, 3: 15-17.) On the next day the government indicted Mr. Lopez-Lopez and revoked the 48 month offer. On January 3, 2008 prior counsel conflicted off this case and present counsel was appointed.

Upon receipt of prior counsel's file, present counsel discovered the 48 month plea agreement signed by Mr. Lopez-Lopez. (Ex. C hereto.) Also in that file was a fax memo dated November 19, 2007 from prior counsel to the government stating that Mr. Lopez-Lopez accepted the 48 month offer but that prior counsel "will continue to try and convince you to a lesser term due to possible equities in my client's behalf and I will endeavor to send you a letter with as much information as possible on behalf of Mr. Lopez." (Ex. D hereto.) Previous counsel's file does not contain the promised letter.

Mr. Lopez-Lopez now moves this Court for an order allowing Mr. Lopez-Lopez to accept the previous offer.

II.

# THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER THAT MR. LOPEZ-LOPEZ "BE PUT BACK IN THE POSITION HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN IF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION HAD NOT OCCURRED"

It is clear from the transcript of the hearings and previous counsel's file that Mr. Lopez-Lopez accepted a 48 month offer but that prior counsel thought that Mr. Lopez-Lopez should get a better deal. Instead, however, previous counsel got Mr. Lopez-Lopez a worse deal. The net result is that Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during

the very critical stage of the proceedings were an informed decision regarding the government's plea offer had to be made.

The Ninth Circuit, in <u>United States v. Blaylock</u>, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994), held that the failure by counsel to communicate a plea agreement offer to a defendant constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. One of the cases cited in <u>Blaylock</u>, <u>Turner v. Tennessee</u>, took this theory one step further in it's application. <u>Turner v. Tennessee</u>, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988), *vacated on other grounds*, 492 U.S. 902 (1989), *reinstated*, 726 F.Supp. 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1989), *aff'd*, 940 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1991), *cert denied*, ----U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 915 (1992). The Court in <u>Turner</u> found that even though the defendant **was informed** of the government's offer, the way in which the defendant was informed was ineffective. See also, <u>United States v. Rivera-Sanchez</u>, 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (where court found that the "way" in which the defendant was informed by counsel of the government's offer was indeed proper); and, <u>United States v. Carter</u>, 130 F.3d 1432, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1997)(court noted "way" counsel informed defendant did not reflect ineffective advise).

The Ninth Circuit in Blaylock analyzed Turner stating;

[the Court in <u>Turner</u>] Held that an attorney's incompetent advise resulting in the defendant's rejection of a plea offer constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. [citation omitted] If an attorney's incompetent advise regarding a plea bargain falls below a reasonable standards of professional conduct, a fortiori, failure even to inform defendant of the plea offer does so as well.

#### Blaylock at 1465-66.

In <u>United States v. Day</u>, 285 F.3d 1167 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) the 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit considered the issue of whether – "defense counsel's erroneous advice deprived defendant of an opportunity to intelligently consider his plea offer and to make an informed decision about it, and thus, resulted in 'prejudice' to defendant, as

required to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Day, 1167. Counsel in <u>Day</u>, unlike that in <u>Blaylock</u>, actually informed Day about the government's offer, but did so ineffectively. <u>Day</u> at 1169.

#### In <u>Day</u> the court also noted that:

An attorney's incompetent advice resulting in a defendant's rejection of a plea offer can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See <u>United States v. Blaylock</u>, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465-66 (9th Cir.1994). In <u>Blaylock</u>, the defendant's attorney failed to inform him of a plea offer made by the prosecutor, and the defendant went to trial. "[A]lthough **Blaylock** ... received a fair trial, he is not precluded from showing prejudice." <u>Id. at 1466.</u> The court found that **Blaylock** was prejudiced by his counsel's incompetence because the trial court would have been willing to grant **Blaylock** a reduction for acceptance of responsibility if he had accepted a plea offer prior to trial, but that the court refused to do so after trial. See <u>id. at 1467.</u>

<u>Day</u> at 1172. The court in <u>Day</u> felt it necessary to note –"<u>Blaylock</u> is controlling on the prejudice question, because Day also contested factual guilt at trial." <u>Day</u> at 1172.

### Indeed, the court in <u>Day</u> specifically noted:

Because Day contested this charge, there was similarly [as in <u>Blaylock</u>] no basis for awarding acceptance of responsibility after trial. Like **Blaylock**, who was never informed of the plea offer and therefore was deprived of his right to take advantage of it, Day never had the opportunity to consider intelligently his plea offer and to make an informed decision about it. Day's higher sentence after trial similarly resulted from the very fact of a trial itself, a fact that was brought about by [counsel's] erroneous advice. There is no guarantee that Day would have received a reduction for acceptance of responsibility after trial *even if* he had

testified truthfully.

Day at 1172, (emphasis added).

The remedy for counsel's ineffective assistance is to "put the defendant back in the position he would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred." *Blaylock*, 20 F.3d at 1468. Thus, the appropriate remedy is to direct the government to reinstate its original plea offer. See *Id.* at 1468-69. Accord, *Turner v. Tennessee*, 858 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir.1988), *vacated on other grounds*, 492 U.S. 902 (1989), *reinstated*, 726 F.Supp. 1113, *aff'd*, 940 F.2d 1000, *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 1050 (1992) ("the only way to neutralize the constitutional deprivation suffered by Turner," was to allow defendant to consider the state's prior plea offer with the effective assistance of counsel).

It is clear from the Exhibits proffered as well as the conduct of the defendant that the defendant had accepted the 48 month plea offer or would have accepted the offer with conflict free counsel. The conditions set forth in the plea offer were substantially met before previous counsel unilaterally refused to go forward with the plea as scheduled. The defendant signed the plea agreement, waived indictment, and was arraigned on the information. In addition, his attorney noted that he wanted to plead on the date set. All these actions on his part indicate an acceptance of the plea offer.

This Court has the authority to put Mr. Lopez-Lopez back into the same position he was before his attorney unilaterally decided not to plead Mr. Lopez-Lopez. Thus, he asks this Court for that relief.

## III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the above motion.

Dated: April 15, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

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/S/ Knut S. Johnson

Knut S. Johnson, Esq. for Mr. Lopez-Lopez

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